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INTRODUCTION

President George W. Bush signed the Healthy Forests Restoration
Act into law on December 3, 2003 as the cornerstone of his Healthy Forest
Initiative and on the heels of a severe fire season in 2002. 1 The Act was
promulgated in noted response to the upward trend in the number of fires,
fire severity, and acreage involved in each fire, and its defined purpose
was to “reduce wildfire risk to communities” and watersheds. 2 By
implementing a suite of programs and initiatives aimed at expediting and
funding forest projects, the Act’s primary intentions were to reduce
hazardous fuels and address threats to overall forest health. 3 Since the
Act’s passage almost 16 years ago, the United States continues to see a
steady increase in the number of acres burned each year, the average size
of each fire, and the annual cost of wildland firefighting. 4
Fire suppression cost exceeded 2 billion dollars for the U.S. Forest
Service in 2017, making it the most expensive year on record. Between
January 1, 2017 and November 24, 2017, there were 54,858 wildfires
recorded in the United States, burning over 9,152,458 acres. 5 The
economic and health ramifications of the 2017 fire season prompted
Congress to pass provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2018
addressing forest fire management. 6 This note will examine the applicable
provisions passed in the 2018 spending Act, with the intention of
identifying the likeliness that its enactment will significantly affect the
proliferation of wildfires. It will also identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the provisions in the Act. Ultimately, it will conclude that
while the spending provisions within the Act, which assure adequate
funding for the foreseeable future, are positive for fire suppression and
forest management practices, the substantive riders contained within the
1.
Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003: Summary of
Implementation
Actions,
FOREST
AND
RANGELANDS,
https://www.
forestsandrangelands.gov/resources/overview/hfra-implementation12-2004.shtml
(last visited April 30, 2019).
2.
16 U.S.C. § 6501 (2018).
3.
Id.
4.
Paige Blankenbuehler & Brooke Warren, Why Western wildfires are
getting more expensive, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.hcn.org/
issues/49.21/infographic-why-western-wildfires-are-getting-more-expensive.
5.
Id.
6.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong.
(2018).
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Act are largely shortsighted and will be unsuccessful in decreasing fire
suppression cost and mitigating fire severity and size.
This examination will begin in Section II by briefly outlining the
110-year history of forest fire suppression in the United States.
Additionally, Section II will highlight the evolving understanding of fire’s
role in forest ecology over the same period. Section III will define the
current ecological state of forests in the western United States and quantify
the scope of the problem facing forest managers throughout the West.
Section IV will evaluate the controlling Acts most relevant to this
examination: the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”), the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), the Healthy Forest
Restoration Act (“HFRA”), the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and
Enhancement Act (“FLAME”), and the applicable fire provisions in the 2014
Farm Bill. Discussion and examination of the recently passed provisions
in the 2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act will follow. Finally, Section
V will analyze where the culmination of these controlling Acts leaves
wildfire policy in 2019 and the likelihood that these Acts will be able to
affect change in the modern wildfire regime.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The pertinent history of the Forest Service’s storied relationship
with wildfire suppression began in 1910. 7 In the fire season of 1910,
nearly five million acres of Forest Service lands were scorched in a single
event that caused the death of 78 firefighters.8 This fire season marked the
beginning of the Forest Service’s policy of extinguishing all fires as soon
as possible, a job at which they became quite proficient.9 By 1935, the
United States Forest Service established a policy of controlling all fires by
10:00 a.m., and the Forest Service largely sought to prevent all forest fires

7.
Jamison Colburn, The Fire Next Time: Land Use Planning in the
Wildland/Urban Interface, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 223, 225 n.8 (2008)
(citing see generally STEPHEN J. PYNE, YEAR OF FIRES : THE STORY OF THE GREAT
FIRES OF 1910 (2001); STEPHEN J. PYNE, FIRE IN AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
WILDLAND AND RURAL FIRE (1982)).
8.
Id.
9.
Id. (citing Geoffrey H. Donovan & Thomas C. Brown, Be Careful
What You Wish For: The Legacy of Smokey Bear, 5 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY 73, 74
(2007)).
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until the late 1970s.10 The result of these efforts was impressive, and the
proficiency at which the Forest Service extinguished forest fires was
unparalleled. In 1900, the annual acreage burned in the western United
States was 30 million acres—between 1935 and 1979 that average was 5
million acres.11 Even though the ecological benefits of sporadic low
intensity fire were well known nearly three decades prior, the Forest
Service didn’t adapt its fire suppression policy until 1995, when it began
taking a more comprehensive approach to fire management, which
employed mechanical thinning, prescribed fire, and selective fire
suppression to remove excessive forest fuels.12
III. CURRENT ECOLOGICAL STATUS OF WESTERN FORESTS
Though 57 percent of the forest in the United States are privately
owned, of the 19.6 percent owned by the federal government, a sizable
portion are in the Western United States. 13 In addition to these federal
forest reserves, state and tribal forests make up 23 percent of the United
States forests and are managed under a paradigm similar to that of the
federal forests.14 The overall health of these forests is best summarized by
the 2013 Western Governors Association’s Report to then Secretary of
Agriculture Vilsack: “Federal forest lands throughout the West are
experiencing serious environmental stress that affects the health and
vitality of these ecosystems. They are overgrown; they exhibit all the
symptoms of an unhealthy ecosystem; and they demand urgent
attention.”15
10.
Jesse B. Davis, Comment: The Healthy Forests Initiative: Unhealthy
Policy Choices in Forest and Fire Management, 34 ENVTL. L. 1209, 1211 (2004).
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Michael Goergen, James Harding, Carlton Owen, Mark Rey, & Lynn
Scarlett, The State and Future of U.S. Forestry and Forest Industry- Workshop Report
and
Recommendations,
15
(May
2013),
http://usendowment.
org/images/Forest_Sector_Report_--_FINAL_9.5.13.pdf (last visited April 27, 2018)
(reporting for the U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities, with funding
provided by USDA Forest Service, State, and Private Forestry).
14.
Id. (citing data originally obtained from the US Forest Service
contained in the report’s graph).
15.
Id. (citing Western Governors’ Association, “Western Governors
request private sector be utilized to improve federal forest management,” Letter to
Secretary Vilsack, April 15, 2013, https://healthyforests.org/2013/04/western-
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This report identifies three factors that are influencing the overall
health of federal forests. Anecdotally, these three factors are likely also
affecting state and tribal forests in a comparable manner. The factors
identified by the report are: (1) climate change; (2) forest loss due to
fragmentation on non-federal lands; and (3) a “constrained federal
financial capacity and societal support.” 16 The report notes that warming
temperatures and shifting weather patterns are contributing to increased
frequency and intensity of fires, proliferation of insect infestations, loss of
water quality and availability, and changes in composition of vegetation. 17
Fragmentation occurs as an increasing human population continues to
expand into the wildland urban interface (“WUI”), which places strain on
the forest and makes addressing potential forest fires more complicated. 18
Finally, the report discusses the recent diversion of funds from forest
management practices to fire suppression efforts, which is a critical factor
and detrimental to the future of forest health. 19 Beyond these three
overarching factors, the challenges posed by invasive species is also
discussed.20 The report concludes that federal forests will continue to
experience severe fire outbreaks.
IV. CONTROLLING ACTS
A.

National Environmental Protection Act

Many of the statutory acts that shape wildfire policy in the United
States are informed by or in response NEPA; therefore, a brief
understanding of its purpose and substantive provisions is prudent. NEPA
was passed on January 1, 1970 with a sweeping statement of purpose
governors-private-sector-should-be-utilized-to-improve-federal-forestmanagement/).
16.
Id.
17.
Id. (citing to USDA, Resource Planning Act Assessment, 2010;
USDA, National Report on Sustainable Forests, 2012; see also Donald McKenzie,
David L. Peterson, & Jeremy J. Littell, Global warming and stress complexes in
forests of western North America, in ANDRZEJ BYTNEROWICZ, ET AL., WILDLAND
FIRES AND AIR POLLUTION, DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE 8, 638 Ch.
15 (2009).
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. at 17.
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recognizing “man’s activity on the interrelations of all components of the
natural environment” and setting out a policy of using “all practicable
means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and
maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.” 21 A list of objectives to
which the government hopes to preserve follows the statement of purpose.
These lofty goals aim to preserve, among other elements, biological
diversity, natural esthetics, and a healthful human environment. 22
NEPA mandates agencies prepare a report or recommendation on
“proposals for legislation and other major federal action significantly
affecting the human environment.” 23 The report required under NEPA
does not “impose a substantive duty on agencies to mitigate adverse
environmental effects or to include in each environmental impact
statement a fully developed mitigation plan,” but it does ensure that
agencies “will take a ‘hard look’ at environmental consequences” and
guarantee “broad public dissemination of relevant information.” 24 In
general, NEPA promulgates a set of rules that require an agency to prepare
an environmental assessment (“EA”), and, if necessary, an environmental
impact statement (“EIS”), that considers the reasonably foreseeable
environmental effects of a proposed major federal action and assesses
multiple alternative actions, including the alternative of no action. 25
Numerous lawsuits challenging the scope of an EIS or an EA have
judicially defined the parameters of NEPA evaluations, and the size and
relative scope of an EIS or an EA has greatly expanded over time. This
expansion is a direct result of NEPA litigation and agency wariness to
having its eventual decision overturned or stayed because of a finding of
inadequacy in the NEPA process. 26 Recent forest fire and hazardous fuels

21.
22.
23.
24.

42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(a) (2018).
42 U.S.C.A. § 4331(b) (2018).
42 U.S.C.A. § 4332(c) (2018).
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 333

(1989).
25.
42 U.S.C. § 4332.
26.
SANDRA B. ZELLMER & J AN G. LAITOS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
RESOURCE LAW, 59 (2014) (noting that significant percentage of environmental
litigation is brought under NEPA and that “the sheer volume of each EIS has increased
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reduction policy has been largely aimed at finding ways in which the
NEPA timeframe can be shortened or eliminated.
B.

National Forest Management Act

Congress passed NFMA in the early 1970s as an attempt to exert
control over the Forest Service's discretion.27 Composed of two primary
parts, the Act sought to implement large scale planning over distinct forest
units. First, the Act requires the Forest Service to develop Land and
Resource Management Plans (“LRMPs”) to guide and govern all activities
on a distinct forest unit. 28 These plans are to be developed with extensive
public input and revised every 15 years, unless conditions in the unit
significantly change requiring review on a more frequent basis.29 In
addition to the requirement that the Forest Service develop LRMPs, the
NFMA also set out specific substantive criteria to assure each forest unit
is managed in a manner that protects forest resources while allowing
timber harvest. 30 LRMPs also must be promulgated in accordance with
NEPA.31
C.

Healthy Forest Restoration Act

Enacted on December 3, 2003, the stated purpose of the HFRA
was to:
[I]mprove the capacity of the Secretary of Agriculture and
the Secretary of the Interior to conduct hazardous fuels
reduction projects on National Forest System lands and
Bureau of Land Management lands aimed at protecting
communities, watersheds and wildfire, to enhance efforts
to protect watersheds and address threats to forest and

dramatically, as agencies attempt to ‘bulletproof’ their analyses by making them
longer and more detailed.”).
27.
16 U.S.C. § 1600-1604 (2018).
28.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(f).
29.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(f).
30.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3).
31.
16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(1).
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range land health, including catastrophic wildfire, across
the landscape and for other purposes. 32
While HFRA sets out provisions under five sections, the most pertinent
section to this commentary is Title I. The meat of Title I is effectively a
codification of the Western Governors’ Association’s ten-year forestry
strategy plan.33 In 2000, the Association drafted the original forestry
management strategy, which was developed in conjunction with public
interest groups and federal agencies.34 Much like the eventual goals of the
HFRA, the original aim of the ten-year plan was to improve “fire
prevention and suppression programs, reduce hazardous fuels, restore fire
adaptive ecosystems, and promote community assistance.” 35 As the
subsequent Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 only amended Title
I of the HFRA and most wildfire suppression efforts are completed under
Title I’s provisions, Title II – Title VI will not be discussed in this
examination.
However, continued support, both politically and
financially, for the entirety of the HFRA is critically important to gaining
an advantage on western wildfires, as the Act comprehensively aids in the
furtherance of a robust forest industry and healthy forest ecosystems.
Notably, Title II of the Act provided direct support to overcome economic
and information barriers hindering the use and production of the woody
biomass created from fuels reduction projects, which ultimately addresses
a fundamental problem of all initiatives designed to aid in forest
management—the lack of viable timber markets in the Western United
States.36
The main objective of Title I of the Act is prioritization of
hazardous fuel reduction projects and a streamlined NEPA analysis. By
simultaneously identifying projects with the highest likelihood of
successful intervention and then expediting NEPA analysis by shortcutting
32.
Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-48, 117 Stat.
1887, 1887 (2003).
33.
Reda M. Dennis-Parks, Healthy Forests Restoration Act – Will It
Really Protect Homes and Communities, 31 ECOLOGY L. Q. 639, 646 (2004).
34.
Id.
35.
Id. (citing to Western Governors Association, A Collaborative
Approach to Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment 10Year Comprehensive Strategy Implementation (May 2002), https://www.
forestsandrangelands.gov/documents/resources/plan/11-23-en.pdf).
36.
16 U.S.C.A. § 6531 (repealed in late 2018 subsequent to the drafting
of this examination. Pub. L. No. 115-334 (Dec. 20, 2018)).
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certain NEPA requirements, the HFRA aimed to produce action by
moving projects from proposal to actual work on the ground in a matter of
months not years. The HFRA—in five parts—outlines the prioritization
of federal lands involved in hazardous fuel reduction projects:
(1) Federal lands in the wildland-urban interface (WUI)
in at risk communities;
(2) condition class 3 Federal land, in such proximity to a
municipal water supply system or a stream feeding such a
system within a municipal watershed that a significant
risk exists that a fire disturbance event would have
adverse effects on the water quality of the municipal water
supply or the maintenance of the system, including a risk
to water quality posed by erosion following such a fire
disturbance event;
(3) condition class 2 Federal land located within fire
regime I, fire regime II, or fire regime III, in such
proximity to a municipal water supply system or a stream
feeding such a system within a municipal watershed that
a significant risk exists that a fire disturbance event would
have adverse effects on the water quality of the municipal
water supply or the maintenance of the system, including
a risk to water quality posed by erosion following such a
fire disturbance event;
(4) Federal land on which windthrow or blowdown, ice
storm damage, the existence of an epidemic of disease or
insects, or the presence of such an epidemic on
immediately adjacent land and the imminent risk it will
spread, poses a significant threat to an ecosystem
component, or forest or rangeland resource, on the
Federal land or adjacent non- Federal land; and
(5) Federal land not covered by paragraphs (1) through (4)
that contains threatened and endangered species habitat,
if—
(A) natural fire regimes on that land are identified
as being important for, or wildfire is identified as
a threat to, an endangered species, a threatened
species, or habitat of an endangered species or
threatened species in a species recovery plan
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prepared under section 1533 of this title, or a
notice published in the Federal Register
determining a species to be an endangered
species or a threatened species or designating
critical habitat;
(B) the authorized hazardous fuel reduction
project will provide enhanced protection from
catastrophic wildfire for the endangered species,
threatened species, or habitat of the endangered
species or threatened species; and
(C) the Secretary complies with any applicable
guidelines specified in any management or
recovery plan described in subparagraph (A). 37
Any projects that fall within these parameters are then to be subjected to a
modified NEPA analysis.
One of the primary objectives of the HFRA was to streamline
NEPA evaluations; therefore, enabling projects to complete the necessary
EAs and begin implementation in a shorter timeframe—months instead of
years.
Except for the NEPA alterations noted below, projects
implemented under the HFRA are still subject to review in accordance
with NEPA and other applicable laws, which means that an EA or an EIS
must be issued before a project can begin. 38 The HFRA truncates the
NEPA timeline through four primary tools: 1) the NEPA analysis under
the HFRA framework requires fewer proposed alternatives be analyzed for
projects at large; 2) the requirements for proposed alternatives are even
further reduced for projects in the WUI; 3) the HFRA places limits on the
public comment period; and 4) the HFRA is a limited waiver of the
Appeals Reform Act, meaning it reduces the accessibility to appeals and
judicial actions.39
First, the reviewing agency is not required to consider multiple
alternatives to the action presented. 40 Whereas, under a regular NEPA
evaluation a judicially implied three to five alternatives are required in

37.
38.
39.
40.

16 U.S.C. § 6512(a) (2018).
16 U.S.C. § 6514(a) (2018).
16 U.S.C. §§ 6514-15; 36 C.F.R. § 218 (2004).
16 U.S.C. § 6514(c).
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addition to the proposed action and “no action” alternative, 41 the HFRA
only requires the analysis of the “proposed agency action,” a “no action”
alternative, and one additional action alternative. 42 The review of the one
supplemental alternative is only required if it is proposed during the
collaborative scoping process and “meets the purpose and need of the
project, in accordance with regulations promulgated by the Council of
Environmental Quality.” 43
Second, the requirements to review
alternatives are further reduced if the proposed fuels reduction project is
conducted within the WUI (only the proposed action and one alternative
are to be analyzed in the EA or EIS) and even less restrictive if within one
and a half miles of an at-risk community (no alternative is required, the
EA or EIS must only assess the proposed action). 44
The HFRA shortened the time frame for the public to evaluate and
comment on proposed HFRA projects and severely restricted public
comments and objections to approved projects; therefore, reducing the
possibility of delays in project implementation due to lengthy comment
periods and extended appeals. Unlike a standard NEPA public comment
period, which is open to all who wish to comment, both verbally and in
writing, comments under the HFRA are only accepted in writing during a
limited time period.45 As soon as comments have been taken and the
Forest Service has considered their validity, draft decision documents are
released and only those parties that submitted specific comments during
the comment period can object during the pre-decisional administrative
review process.46 Additionally, objections can only be made during this
pre-decisional process on issues raised during the comment period. After
the agency issues its final decision, appeals will only be heard from those
parties involved in the original development of the plan and who submitted
written comments and objections.47 Much like the access to agency

41.
Dennis-Parks, supra note 33, at 648.
42.
Id.
43.
16 U.S.C. § 6514(c)(1)(C).
44.
16 U.S.C. § 6514(d).
45.
16 U.S.C. § 6514; 36 C.F.R. § 218 (2013).
46.
Katie Hoover et al., Forest Management Provisions Enacted in the
115th Congress, H.R. REP. NO. R45696 at 7, 115th Cong. (2019) [hereinafter Summary
of 115th Congressional Action] (citing to 36 C.F.R. § 218 (2018)).
47.
Id. (citing Department of Interior and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act (“Appeals Reform Act”), Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat.
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appeals, judicial review of an agency’s administrative decisions is also
limited in time and scope under the HFRA. 48 In passing the HFRA,
Congress hoped to implement a process in which fuels reduction projects
were conceived, reviewed, and implemented in the shortest amount of time
possible.
Critics of the HFRA pointed to several perceived inadequacies in
the Act, which they asserted would keep it from fulfilling its stated
purpose. First, detractors claimed the HFRA applied a one-size-fits-all
approach to forest management by assuming that manual thinning was the
best management practice for all forest types and in all situations, which
does not correlate with modern understanding of the healthy role fire can
play in forest health.49 This criticism was largely unfounded because the
Act sought to implement projects in the WUI and other areas where
controlled natural burns and prescribed burns had limited applicability,
and the term “appropriate tools” in the Acts definition of “Authorized
Hazardous Fuels Reductions Projects” was interpreted to include
prescribed burns and use of naturally occurring wildland fire.50 Second,
critics found it unlikely that the Forest Service could take advantage of the
truncated NEPA review to green light time-dependent forest projects, such
as beetle kills and blowdowns that have a limited window for
economically productive harvesting, which could leave only large fireresistant old growth trees as the primary marketable timber within a project
area.51 While the provisions of the Act as originally passed appeared to
substantially define and limit the scope of qualifying projects to those that
fit the purpose of the Act, opponents of the HFRA claimed its potential
pitfall was that it could be used as a “logging loop hole” (i.e. allowing
logging of mature marketable trees under the auspices of thinning in places
otherwise not able to be logged). 52
Critically, the Act as originally passed failed to adequately
provide for the abundance of land in the growing WUI that is not under
federal control, land that is largely responsible for the increasing cost of

1374, 1419 (1992); see also 36 C.F.R. § 218.1–218.16 for updated objection
procedure).
48.
16 U.S.C.A. 6516.
49.
Dennis-Parks, supra note 33, at 650–651.
50.
Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note 46 at 5 n. 26.
51.
Dennis-Parks, supra note 33, at 654–657.
52.
Id. at 643.
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fighting wildfires and economic loss resulting from those fires.53 The Act
did not provide for collaborative efforts with state and local municipalities
or transfer of funds to address those areas of the WUI outside of federal
control. Finally, the Act’s success is reliant on adequate funding provided
to carry out the projects it promotes; therefore, during bad fire seasons, the
fuels management funds are usually the first taken to support suppression
efforts.
D.

Federal Land Assistance, Management and Enhancement Act

FLAME was enacted on October 30, 2009 and statutorily required
the development of a cohesive wildfire management strategy. 54 As a
collaborative effort between the Department of Interior and the
Department of Agriculture, the strategy was to be completed within one
year of the enactment. 55 The Act’s vision for a cohesive strategy was “to
safely and effectively extinguish fire, when needed; use fire where
allowable; manage our natural resources; and as a Nation, live with
wildland fire.”56 Seven criteria were to be assessed and addressed in the
final management strategy. Those criteria are:
(1) the identification of the most cost-effective means for
allocating fire management budget resources;
(2) the reinvestment in non-fire programs by the Secretary
of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture;

53.
Tania Schoennagel et al., Adapt to more wildfire in western North
American forests as climate changes, 114(18) PNAS 4582, 4583 (May 2017),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/114/18/4582.full.pdf (“Between 1990 and 2010,
almost 2 million homes were added in the 11 states of the Western United States
increasing the WUI by 24%. . . . Since 1990, the average annual number of structures
lost to wildfire has increased by 300%, with a significant step up since 2008. . . .
Because of the people and property values at risk, WUI fires fundamentally change
the tactics and cost of fire suppression as compared with fighting remote fires and
account for as much as 95% of suppression costs.” (internal citations omitted)).
54.
43 U.S.C. 1748(b) (2018).
55.
Id.
56.
U.S. Dep’t of Interior & U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Building a Cohesive
Strategy,
FORESTS
AND
RANGELANDS,
www.forestsandrangelands.gov/
strategy/building.shtml (last visited March 22, 2019) [hereinafter Building a Cohesive
Strategy].
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(3) employing the appropriate management response to
wildfires;
(4) assessing the level of risk to communities;
(5) the allocation of hazardous fuels reduction funds
based on the priority of hazardous fuels reduction
projects;
(6) assessing the impacts of climate change on the
frequency and severity of wildfire; and
(7) studying the effects of invasive species on wildfire
risk.57
Since the Act’s passage it has had significant support from the Western
Governors’ Association, which was the group responsible for the
formulating the documents behind the HFRA. In 2016, the Governors’
Policy Statement called for full implementation of FLAME’s provisions
and funding to provide for the Act’s full implementation. 58
The main thrust of the Act was to create a National Cohesive
Wildland Fire Management Strategy. 59 The strategy dictated three phases
of implementation. Phase I was the blueprinting process, which aimed at
establishing the primary goals and structure of the strategy.60
Implementation of Phase 1 involved cohesive strategy planning such that
“the wildland fire strategy would not be limited to federal lands, but would
consider the needs of all lands and balance regional needs and perspectives
with national planning.” 61 Aside from creating a strategic framework for
FLAME’s implementation, Phase I identified three primary goals:
“creating resilient landscapes, fire adapted communities, and more
effective response to wildfire.” 62 Phase II required the completion of
regional assessments, which evaluated “landscape elements, ecological
processes, and human values of local resources.” 63 Phase III saw the
57.
43 U.S.C. § 1748b(b)(2012).
58.
Policy Resolution 2016-06: Wildland Fire Management and Resilient
Landscapes, WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, http://westgov.org/images/editor/201606_Wildland_Fire_Management.pdf (last visited March 22, 2019) [hereinafter Policy
Resolution 2016-06].
59.
Id.
60.
Building a Cohesive Strategy, supra note 56.
61.
Id.
62.
Policy Resolution 2016-06, supra note 58.
63.
Building a Cohesive Strategy, supra note 56.
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creation of science-based risk analysis reports and action plans, and this
phase culminated in the creation of the National Cohesive Wildland Fire
Management Strategy. 64 The final plan is credited as a collaborative effort
by “[f]ederal, state, local, and tribal governments, non-governmental
partners, and public stakeholders.” 65 The final National Strategy:
establishes broad, strategic national-level direction as a
foundation for implementing programs and activities
across the nation.
Based on a landscape-level
collaborative approach, describing how the Nation can
focus future efforts in making strategic investments to
reduce the severe effects of wildfire on areas of high
risk.66
E.

Agricultural Act of 2014

The Agricultural Act of 2014 (“2014 Farm Bill”) contained
several provisions to increase the pace and scope at which agencies could
implement forest, watershed, and rangeland restorations. 67 These
provisions amended the HFRA in two primary ways. Most notably, the
2014 Farm Bill created a 3000-acre categorical exclusion (“Farm Bill
CE”) for treatment of insect or disease infestations, which excluded the
proposed project from NEPA analysis and instead imposed a collaborative
review process.68 Additionally, these provisions gave states 60 days to
request that the Forest Service designate landscape-scale areas
experiencing, or at risk of experiencing an insect or disease epidemic. 69
45.6 million acres of National Forest system lands across 35 states were
designated as eligible for CE projects under the 2014 Farm Bill. 70
64.
Id.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Agricultural Act of 2014, 7 U.S.C. § 9001 (2014).
68.
U.S. Forest Service, Farm Bill Insect and Disease Designations,
Key Messages, U.S. FOREST SERV. (May 19, 2014), https://www.sierraforestlegacy.
org/Resources/Conservation/ProjectsPlans/FarmBillCE/FS_Key_Messages_FarmBil
lCE.pdf.
69.
Id.; see also Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note
46, at 8.
70.
Id.
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However, designation under these provisions was not a guarantee that
work would be carried out on the affected areas, only that the areas were
available for further evaluation and potential implementation of the Farm
Bill CE. Additionally, the 2014 Farm Bill did not appropriate any funds
for these projects. 71 Projects implemented in the designated areas, which
aimed to use the categorical exclusion, were to meet the following
requirements: (1) maximize the retention of old growth and large trees, (2)
consider the best available science, (3) be limited to areas within the
designated disease or infestation area or the WUI, (4) exclude areas in
Wilderness, wilderness study areas, or areas where the removal of
vegetation is restricted or prohibited, (5) prohibit the establishment of
permanent roads, and (6) decommission any temporary roads constructed
for the project within three years of project completion. 72
The Farm Bill CE was recently challenged in Center for
Biological Diversity, et. al. v. Eli Ilano, et. al.73 This case involves the
application of the Farm Bill CE in the Tahoe National Forest for a logging
project aimed at combating disease and beetle infestation. 74 Opponents of
the project claimed that the Forest Service did not properly evaluate the
projects potential effect on the California spotted owl and that the project
should have been subject to NEPA evaluation. 75 The court found that
“because no NEPA review was required for the area designation, and
because the extraordinary circumstances analysis of the effects of the . . .
[p]roject on the California spotted owl was adequate, summary judgment
is granted to the defendants.” 76 The case is currently on appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the court’s
decision will have far reaching ramifications on the legality of future CE’s.
F.

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018

In response to the unprecedented fire season of 2017, Congress
amended the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 (“2018
Appropriations Act”) to include several provisions aimed at addressing the
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
261 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1071.
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wildland fire situation in the United States. 77 Congress passed the Act and
it was signed into law by President Donald Trump in March of 2018. 78
The Act contains provisions aimed at addressing the funding shortage that
occurs when the Forest Service and other agencies are faced with extensive
fire suppression costs that exceed their budget line item. 79 Additionally,
the Act also contains substantive provisions that amend the HFRA and
institute an additional CE for hazardous fuels reduction projects under
3000 acres.80 This section will address the spending provisions contained
in the Act first, and then turn to the more complicated substantive
provisions.
1.

Spending Provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2018

As wildfires have become larger, more intense, and increasingly
in contact with the expanding WUI, the cost of battling these blazes has
correspondingly increased. The spending provisions contained in the 2018
Appropriations Act are aimed at stemming the chronic underfunding of
wildfire suppression efforts in the United States. As an example of agency
underfunding: “the 2015 budget provided funding for 70 % of the 10-year
average of wildfire suppression costs,” at a time when projected costs were
far exceeding that average. 81 When wildfire suppression costs are
underestimated and underfunded, the agencies charged with controlling
these blazes engage in the practice of “fire borrowing.” 82 “Fire borrowing”
and its resulting problems are summarized as follows:
The practice of diverting money earmarked for wildfire
prevention activities to wildfire suppression activities,
and it has created a vicious cycle in wildfire management.
77.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018: Wildfire Suppression
Funding and Forest Management Activities Act, H.R. 1625, 115th Cong. §§
101−212 (2018) [hereinafter H.R. 1625].
78.
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115-141, 132
Stat. 348 (2018).
79.
H.R. 1625 § 102−103.
80.
H.R. 1625 § 605.
81.
Brian Bona, The Wildfire Crisis: How the Federal Government Has
Tried To Stop The Burn, 6 ARIZ. J. ENVT. L. & POL’Y 1081, 1084 (2016).
82.
Id.
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The agencies cannot adequately minimize the wildfires
using reduction techniques because all their funds go to
emergency firefighting. Since the agencies are unable to
fully engage in preventative measures, the wildfires
become increasingly worse in subsequent years, which
drives up the cost of fighting the fires and forces the
agencies to rely further on ‘fire-borrowing.’ 83
This chronic underfunding of forest fire suppression has continually
threatened the efficacy of agency actions aimed at solving or mitigating
the increasing wildfire problem. No matter how effective forest
management plans and practices might be, if their funding is diverted and
they are not implemented to their fullest extent, they will never be able to
mitigate the increasing fire danger.
The 2018 Appropriations Act makes a significant commitment to
long-term funding of forest fire suppression and wildfire disaster funding.
Under the division of the Act titled Wildfire Suppression Funding and
Forest Management Activities Act, Title I, Wildfire and Disaster Funding
Adjustment, a wildfire suppression funding scheme is laid out through
2027.84 The provisions provide that the Wildland Fire Management
accounts of the Department of Interior and the Department of Agriculture
shall be funded to an amount of 2.25 billion dollars in the year 2020 and
shall increase to not more than 2.95 billion dollars in the year 2027.85
Attached to these funds are several provisions outlining reporting
requirements; the most important of which will aid in the evaluation of
“fuel treatments” on fire behavior and suppression expenditures. 86
Additionally, the Act earmarks 2,880,338,000 dollars for varied forest fire
suppression and forest management activities through September 30,
2021.87 By dedicating funds expressly for firefighting cost over the next
nine years, Congress has assured that the Department of Interior and the
Department of Agriculture can allocate proper funding to the fire

83.
Id. (citing Senator John McCain’s website, Senators McCain,
Barrasso and Flake Reintroduce Legislation to Fully Fund Wildfire Suppression and
Boost Proactive Forest Management (Feb. 13, 2015) (website no longer available).
84.
H.R. 1625. § 102(a)(3)(F)(i).
85.
Id.
86.
H.R. 1625. § 104.
87.
H.R. 1625. § 102.
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prevention strategies outlined in the HFRA and that those provisions can
be executed to fullest extent.
2.

Substantive Provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2018

The 2018 Appropriations Act makes a multitude of substantive
changes and additions to federal wildfire policy, which are purportedly
aimed at increasing overall forest health by additional streamlining for
approval of fuels reduction projects and wildfire resilience projects as well
as addressing ongoing agency concerns.88 The most notable provision is
the creation of an additional categorical exclusion, which excludes NEPA
analysis for Wildfire Resilience Projects.89 These projects are limited in
size to 3000 acres.90 Each project must provide for the “retention of oldgrowth and large trees, as appropriate for the forest type, to the extent that
the trees promote stands that are resilient to insects and disease, and reduce
the risk or extent of, or increase the resilience to wildfires,” with priority
given to projects in the WUI.91 Several safeguard provisions act as the
stand-in for a NEPA EA or EIS and these include:
(B) consider the best available scientific information to
maintain or restore the ecological integrity, including
maintaining and restoring structure, function,
composition, and connectivity; and
(C) is developed and implemented through a collaborative
process that – (i) includes multiple interested persons
representing diverse interests; and (ii)(I) is transparent
and nonexclusive; or (II) meets the requirements for a
resource advisory committee. . . .92
In addition to the CE for Wildfire Resilience Projects, the 2018
Appropriations Act also contains six other management reforms: (1)
88.
H.R. 1625. §§ 201–212.
89.
H.R. 1625. § 202 (inserting § 605 at the end of Healthy Forests
Restoration Act and creating an additional CE beyond that established in the 2014
Farm Bill).
90.
H.R. 1625. § 202(c)(1).
91.
H.R. 1625. §§ 202(b)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A).
92.
H.R. 1625. § 202(b)(1)(B−C).
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HFRA inclusion for projects building fire and fuel breaks; (2) 20-year
stewardship contracts; (3) Cottonwood reform; (4) fire hazard mapping
initiative (5) fuels management for protection of electrical transmission
lines; and (6) additions to the good neighbor authority amendment
originally contained in the 2014 Farm Bill.93
The Cottonwood reform provision94 is a targeted response to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Cottonwood Environmental
Law Center v. United States Forest Service,95 which found that the Forest
Service is obligated to consult the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
when a critical habitat for an endangered species is defined under the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) to determine if the current forest
management plans will harm the species. 96 Under section 208, which
amends the Consultation Under Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resources Planning Act of 1974, consultation is no longer required upon
the listing of a new species or designation of critical habitat.97 The
practical result of this change is that agencies—the Forest Service in
particular—will not have to review the implications of species listing on
their forest-wide management plans for up to 15 years.98
While the funding fix seems to be universally applauded, the
substantive provisions are being eyed with some skepticism by
environmental and animal rights groups. The primary points of concern
for these interest groups are the 3000-acre CE and the Cottonwood reform.
It is likely that the CE provisions and the Cottonwood reform will be
judicially challenged. Prior to the enactment of the HFRA in 2003, the
Healthy Forest Initiative created five new types of categorical exclusions.
These categorical exclusions ranged in size from 4500 acres for controlled
burns, to 1000 acres for mechanical treatments, down to 70 acres for live

93.
H.R. 1625. §§ 203−212; see also USDA Office of Commc’ns,
Secretary Perdue Applauds Fire Funding Fix in Omnibus, USDA (March 23, 2018),
https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/USDAOC/bulletins/1e46559.
94.
H.R. 1625. § 208.
95.
789 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2015).
96.
Jessica Kutz, Fire Funding Fixes Comes With Environmental
Rollbacks, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (March 29, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/
wildfire-fire-funding-fix-includes-environmental-rollbacks.
97.
H.R. 1625. § 208(a).
98.
Kutz, supra note 96.
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tree harvest with incidental live tree removal. 99 The largest of these
exclusions for fuel reduction was challenged in Sierra Club v. Bosworth,100
and it was invalidated on the grounds that the:
Forest Service failed to engage in the required scoping
process prior to the CE’s establishment, failed to conduct
a reasoned cumulative impacts analysis, failed to consider
the extent to which impact of fuels reduction projects was
highly controversial and uncertain, and failed to define the
CE with requisite specificity. 101
It is likely that the CE in the 2018 Act would be challengeable on similar
grounds. Judicial review of the Cottonwood reform would be a case of first
impression. It seems unlikely that if critical habitat were designated within
a forest, that a 3000-acre hazardous fuels treatment could occur without a
NEPA analysis and full consultation under Section 7 of the ESA. In
juxtaposition to both of these assertions is the previously mentioned Ilano
case which found no fault in a CE under the 2014 Farm Bill.
V.

ANALYSIS

Congress should be applauded for the recent passage of the fire
spending provisions in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018,
which were aimed at ending “fire borrowing.” State, local, and federal fire
agencies have been calling for an end to “fire borrowing” for many years,
and the spending allocations will likely be the most successful of the
wildfire suppression and hazardous fuels management provisions in the
2018 Appropriations Act. However, Congress must also assure continued
significant allocation of funds for hazardous fuels reduction projects and
other fire fuels management techniques under the general funding of the
agencies or the fire suppression allocations in the 2018 Appropriations Act
will be of little significance in the long run.
The passage of the additional 3000-acre CE in the 2018
Appropriations Act was seemingly unnecessary and largely politically
driven. It is redundant because it is essentially a duplication of the CE
99.
SANDRA B. ZELLMER & JAN G. LAITOS, PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
RESOURCE LAW, 252 (2014).
100. 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007).
101. ZELLMER & LAITOS, supra note 99 at 252.
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previously passed in the 2014 Farm Bill and included in the HFRA, with
the exception that some parameters enumerated in the 2014 provisions
have been removed in the 2018 iteration. The primary difference is the
2018 CE is not focused exclusively on disease infestations and will open
areas of the forest that are simply at high fire risk. Additionally, while
projects are to be prioritized in the WUI, that provision is non-binding and
Wildfire Resilience projects under the new CE can be carried out
anywhere in the approximately 58 million acres of National Forest Service
lands that have been identified as at very high fire risk or in an insect
infestations area.102 There is no doubt that huge expanses of western forest
are in extremely poor health and in need of immediate attention, but the
2018 CE is step backward in forest policy and away from the original
controlling acts that recognized the importance of forest-wide planning.
By expanding the use CE’s to arguably all areas of the forest, the purpose
of NEPA has been largely negated and the “basic legal framework for
federal forest management” has been changed. 103 Allowing forest
management decisions to be made 3000 acres at a time forgets the history
of the United States forest reserves, which propelled forest management
plans to look forest-wide.
Ultimately, the looming question is: has the use of CEs become
too widespread in forest management and exceeded the scope and purpose
for which CEs were created in the first place? This is not a novel question
and has been covered at length in legal literature. 104 In 2010, the Executive
Office of the President and the Council on Environmental Quality issued
guidance to aid federal agencies in determining when CEs are
appropriate.105 This press release noted, “categorical exclusions are
102. Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note 46 at 38.
103. Id. (citing S. HRG. 115-112 (e.g., letter submitted by Center for
Biological Diversity); H. REPT. 115-370, Dissenting Views; Martin Nie & Peter
Metcalf, National Forest Management: The Contested Use of Collaboration and
Litigation, 46 ENVTL L. RPT. 10208, 10281-10298 (2016).
104. Kevin H. Moriarty, Circumventing the National Environmental
Policy Act: Agency Abuse of the Categorical Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2312
(2004); Helen Leanne Serassio, Legislative and Executive Efforts to Modernize NEPA
and Create Efficiencies in Environmental Review, 45 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 317 (2015).
105. Exec. Office of the President, Council on Envtl. Quality, White House
Council on Environmental Quality Issues Guidance to Help Federal Agencies Ensure
the Integrity of Environmental Reviews, THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK
OBAMA (Nov 23, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/
eop/ceq/Press_Releases/November_23_2010.
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appropriate in many circumstances but should not be relied on if they
thwart the purposes of NEPA, compromising the quality and transparency
of agency decision making or the opportunity for meaningful public
participation.” 106 While the need to move forest management projects
through the permitting process expeditiously is readily apparent, the 2018
CE seems to be largely intended to allow the Forest Service to
circumnavigate NEPA’s requirements and should likely be found invalid.
Creation of CEs are an understandable expression of frustration to the
delays NEPA causes, but a more appropriate approach is to amend NEPA
to legislatively resolve its problems. By eliminating excessively large EAs
and EISs and indefinitely long evaluation time frames, returning to
development of simplified EAs and EISs, and potentially restricting
litigation through a process similar to that outlined in the HFRA, the
original intention of NEPA can be preserved. 107
CE projects initiated under the 2018 Appropriations Act will
likely be susceptible to judicial challenge, as they were in Sierra Club v.
Bosworth108 and Center for Biological Diversity, et. al. v. Eli Ilano, et.
al.109 This will only serve to shift attention and resources away from the
reduction of fire fuels hazards and fire suppression efforts. The success of
these suits will hinge, in part, on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the
pending appeal of Ilano. Furthermore, the need for the additional CE was
questionable as HFRA projects, 2014 Farm Bill CE projects, and regular
NEPA evaluated projects were being adequately implemented prior to the
2018 Appropriations Act. 110 Finally, the creation of the 2018 CE may
incentivize logging and thinning projects on federal and Forest Service
lands not in the critical WUI area, which is not where these projects will
reap the most benefit.
106. Id.
107. Nancy H. Sutley, Memorandum for Heads of Federal Departments
and Agencies, Improving the Process for Preparing Efficient and Timely
Environmental Reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act (March 6,
2012), THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, https://ceq.doe.gov/docs/ceqregulations-and-guidance/Improving_NEPA_Efficiencies_06Mar2012.pdf.
108. 510 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2007).
109. 261 F. Supp. 3d 1063, 1065 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
110. See
Forest
Serv.,
Projects,
U.S.
FOREST
SERV.,
http://www.fs.usda.gov/projects/kootenai/landmanagement/projects (last visited May
14, 2019) (Listing 67 projects currently under development in Montana using various
programs already in place.).
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This last fact raises the question: will critical funding get to the
WUI and the agencies most in need of help reducing hazardous fuels and
wildfire risk in urban areas? Unfortunately, federal lands do not typically
fall within the WUI; therefore, spending capital and human resources
conducting fuel reduction projects on federal lands may not be the best
approach to reduce the increasing cost of wildfire suppression. 111 While
the applicable statutes and acts statutorily provide for resource sharing
between the Forest Service, other agencies, and states, funding allocations
do not show significant funds moving beyond the Forest Service or the
Department of Interior. An addendum to a 2013 study on the rising cost of
fires notes:
Of the $3.33 billion in average annual federal wildfire
funding since 2002, 91 percent has been used for
protecting federal lands; more than 70 percent of the
funding for federal land protection has been appropriated
to the FS, with just less than 30 percent appropriated to
DOI. Nearly 7 percent has been used for wildfire
protection assistance to state and local governments; 65
percent of assistance funding has been through the FS,
and 32 percent has been through FEMA, with DOI
providing 3 percent.112
Until funds move to the entities most likely to affect change in the WUI,
it is unlikely that substantive changes in policy will be effective at
decreasing fire severity, size, cost, and threat to communities.
Because FLAME laid the groundwork and completed the
extensive planning required to implement a cohesive wildland fire
strategy, Congress may have missed an opportunity in the 2018
Appropriations Act to fund and implement projects that would have
111. See generally Ross W. Gorte, Federal Funding for Wildfire Control
and Management, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., April 22, 2010, at 11,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RL33990.pdf
(This
article discusses funding allocations and the difficulty in deciding where federal funds
are best allocated. The author does not make the assertion that, perhaps, funding would
be best diverted from federal lands.)
112. Ross Gorte, Ph.D, The Rising Cost of Wildfire Protection,
Addendum: How Wildfire Protection is Funded, HEADWATERS ECONOMICS, 13 (June
2013), https://headwaterseconomics.org/wp-content/uploads/fire-costs-backgroundreport.pdf.
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utilized the information and planning synthesized in the creation of
FLAME’s comprehensive strategy. Had Congress assured that resources
were allocated to areas in WUI, where they would have the greatest effect
on mitigating the increased cost of battling modern wildfires, the longterm effects of their actions would have perhaps been more effective than
implementing an additional CE. The cost of rebuilding the 12,000 homes
lost in the 2017 fire season has been estimated at 25 billion dollars,
FLAME could have provided the information and planning to assure that
resources would be allocated to those areas with the highest likelihood of
controlling these cost. 113 By turning its back on FLAME in favor of the
NEPA shortcuts that CEs create, Congress has perpetuated the illconceived mindset that wildfire management is better served by short-term
gains than by long-term strategic planning.
The Cottonwood reform contained in the 2018 Appropriations Act
is difficult to reconcile with the overarching purpose of the ESA. While
proponents of the fix assert that Section 7 consultation must still occur
before a project under a forest plan can move forward, this approach seems
to look past the need to reconcile the activities outlined in a forest plan
with the needs of a listed species or its critical habitat.114 The Cottonwood
provision takes a cart before the horse approach to the ESA. Instead of
defining a forest wide plan appropriate to the species or habitat listing and
then recommending projects that fall within that plan’s parameters, the
Cottonwood provision would allow for projects to be brought forth for
Section 7 consultation that are in accordance with the outdated plan but
not in line with the ESA or the species needs. The Cottonwood Court’s
determination is a more logical approach to reconciling forest-wide plans
with ESA determinations.
Finally, none of the approaches addressed in 2018 Appropriations
Act presented the solution of incentivizing increased land use planning.
While this approach tasks local communities with facilitating the required
changes, it could be subsidized by federal funds. Until living and building
in the WUI is disincentivized, the cost of suppressing wildfires will likely
continue to climb. These land use policies could take on several different
forms, including: requirements to accomplish fuel mitigation prior to
building; prohibitions on certain building materials; additional insurance
113. Kyle Dickman, What If Our Forest Don’t Come Back, OUTSIDE
MAGAZINE (May 9, 2018), https://www.outsideonline.com/2297996/fires-changingforests.
114. Summary of 115th Congressional Action, supra note 46 at 18.
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requirements for structures in the WUI; and finally, a waiver of public
firefighting services for structures built within the WUI. This approach
would likely be the most successful at stemming future increases in
suppression costs, but it may also be the hardest to accomplish politically.
While the “fire borrowing” fix in the 2018 Appropriations Act was
commendable, by passing the substantive appropriation’s riders in the
2018 Appropriations Act, Congress has turned its back on cohesive forest
management in favor of a piecemeal approach. The Cottonwood reform
the CEs, and the lack of commitment to the comprehensive strategy
outlined in FLAME will only serve to cause disjointed forest and fire
suppression policy moving forward. Instead of promoting forwardlooking, collaboration-building, and cohesive approaches, Congress has
written an open discretionary check to the Forest Service and other federal
agencies to do as they please without sufficient planning. This approach
will likely result in increased litigation and little real change in fire
suppression cost and efficacy.
VI. CONCLUSION
As one Forest Service Report notes: “a solution will not happen
overnight.”115 The unintended consequences of a century of fire
suppression success can likely not be unwound in as little as ten years.
Cohesive planning and perseverance are likely all that will solve this
critical problem. By focusing efforts and funding on the WUI and
allocating resources to those agencies most likely to affect change in the
WUI, reduction of fire suppression cost can likely occur. However,
climate change and decreased forest health may require agencies to adopt
new strategies for forest management outside the WUI.
These
management plans should be promulgated under the original policy
intentions of NFMA and NEPA, which required a sensible whole forest,
multiple use approach to management with consideration of multiple
alternatives. Finally, Congress should attempt to consolidate fire
suppression policy under one comprehensive plan, which would utilize the
years of research and planning already implemented.

115.

Bona, supra note 77 at 1083.

